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It Is Logic Rather Than Whom You
Trust: A Rejoinder to Prof. Cohen
By Douglas A. Kahn
This article is the continuation of an exchange that has
taken place between Prof. Stephen B. Cohen and me
concerning the validity of criticisms leveled by Chief
Justice John Roberts on an opinion by then-Judge Sonia
Sotomayor writing for the Second Circuit in the case of
William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner.1
While affirming the Second Circuit’s decision, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court,
criticized and rejected Justice Sotomayor’s construction
of the relevant statutory provision.2 In an article in the
August 3, 2009, issue of Tax Notes,3 Cohen defended
Justice Sotomayor’s construction of the statute and la-
beled Chief Justice Roberts’s criticisms as ‘‘logically
flawed’’ and ‘‘unpersuasive and overstated.’’ I wrote a
piece in Tax Notes disputing Cohen’s analysis and con-
cluded that Chief Justice Roberts’s criticisms were ‘‘per-
suasive and accurately stated.’’4 Cohen then responded
to me in another Tax Notes article in which he concluded
that my arguments are ‘‘contestable and perhaps even
untenable.’’5 This piece is a rejoinder to Cohen’s reply.
In his most recent article, Cohen purports to state the
three major points that I made in my prior article and
proffers his response to each of them. His response to one
of my points is palpably incorrect. In regard to another of
my points, his statement of what I wrote omits crucial
elements of my argument and so does not join issue with
me. However, he does makes several additional points to
which I will respond. As to the remaining third argu-
ment, Cohen’s response is unpersuasive.
Before addressing each of the three disputed issues, as
well as another item that Cohen raised at the end of his
article, I will set forth the conflicting constructions of the
statutory provision that is at the heart of the controversy.
In the Rudkin case, a trust had incurred expenses to
obtain expert advice to assist the trustees in investing the
trust’s assets. There was no dispute that the expenses
were deductible. The dispute centered on the question of
whether the deduction of the expenses was subject to the
limitation imposed by section 67(a) on the amount of
‘‘miscellaneous itemized deductions’’ that can be taken.
Under that provision, only the amount of the aggregate
miscellaneous itemized deductions that exceeds 2 per-
cent of the trust’s adjusted gross income is deductible.
While the AGI concept typically does not apply to a trust,
for purposes of that limitation, the trust will have AGI as
determined by section 67(e).
The dispute in Rudkin was over the question of
whether investment advisory expenses of the trust were
deductible in determining AGI; if so, they would not be
a miscellaneous itemized deduction that is subject to the
limitation. Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court agreed that the expenses in question were miscel-
laneous itemized deductions, but they disagreed on the
construction of the crucial statutory provision on which
the case turned. To put into focus the current dispute
between Cohen and myself, I have set forth below the
relevant portion of section 67(e), the construction of
which is the matter in issue:
For purposes of this section, the AGI of an estate or
trust shall be computed in the same manner as in
the case of an individual, except that:
1. the deduction for costs that are paid or
incurred in connection with the administra-
tion of the estate or trust and that would not
have been incurred if the property were not held in
such trust or estate, and
2. the deductions allowable under sections
642(b), 651, and 661, shall be treated as allow-
able in arriving at AGI. [Emphasis added.]
It is the construction of the language in section 67(e),
which is italicized above, that is the subject of the
dispute. Justice Sotomayor construed that language to
refer to expenses that cannot possibly be incurred by an
individual. Rejecting that construction, the Supreme
Court construed that language as referring to expenses
that customarily would not be incurred by individuals.
Under the Supreme Court’s construction, a trust’s ex-
pense will qualify for a full deduction even though an
individual is not prevented from incurring it as long as it
is not an expense that individuals customarily incur. The
Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision because the Court determined that the
expense was one that customarily is incurred by indi-
viduals. Let us now turn to the points in contention.
Vitiation of a Statutory Clause
Note that there are two separate paragraphs in section
67(e) authorizing full deductions for some deductible
items of a trust. Paragraph (1) allows a full deduction for
deductible ‘‘costs’’ that are paid or incurred in connection
with the administration of the trust, and the second
clause of that paragraph prevents a full deduction for a
trust administration expense unless the expense is one
that ‘‘would not have been incurred’’ by an individual.
Paragraph (2) allows a full deduction for the exemption
1467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-21522, 2006 TNT 203-4.
2Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181 (2008), Doc 2008-948,
2008 TNT 12-6, aff’g the Second Circuit’s decision in Rudkin.
3Stephen B. Cohen, ‘‘Judge Sotomayor’s Tax Opinions,’’ Tax
Notes, Aug. 3, 2009, p. 474, Doc 2009-15953, or 2009 TNT 146-12.
4Douglas A. Kahn, ‘‘Rudkin Testamentary Trust — A Re-
sponse to Prof. Cohen,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 21, 2009, p. 1263, Doc
2009-19184, or 2009 TNT 180-10.
5Stephen B. Cohen, ‘‘Whom Do You Trust? A Reply to Prof.
Kahn,’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 9, 2009, p. 711, Doc 2009-23081, or 2009
TNT 216-7.
Douglas A. Kahn is the Paul G. Kauper Professor of
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Recently, Prof. Stephen B. Cohen and the author
have been engaged in a dispute about statutory con-
struction in the context of the Rudkin decision. This
article resumes that discussion and outlines the con-
flicting views about the broader issues and the proper
approach for courts to take in interpreting statutes.
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deduction that a trust is allowed and for distributions
made to beneficiaries of the trust. Chief Justice Roberts
made the point that if the second clause of paragraph (1)
had the meaning that Justice Sotomayor gave to it, that
would make superfluous the first clause of that para-
graph, which limits that paragraph’s application to trust
or estate administration expenses. If only expenses that
can be incurred exclusively by a trust or estate can be
fully deductible, there would be no significance to requir-
ing, as the first clause does, that the expense be incurred
in connection with the administration of an estate or
trust. Any deductible expense of a trust or estate that
could not be incurred by anyone else would have to be
connected with the administration of the trust or estate,
and so there would be no need to have that requirement
in the first clause of paragraph (1).
In his first article,6 Cohen rejected that argument on
the asserted ground that if it were not for the limitation to
trust administration expenses of the first clause of para-
graph (1), the second clause of that paragraph would
prevent a full deduction for the items listed in paragraph
(2). Of the deductions listed in paragraph (2), that is, the
exemption deduction and the deduction for distributions
to beneficiaries, the deduction for distributions to benefi-
ciaries is an item that cannot be deducted by anyone
other than a trust or estate, and so the second clause of
paragraph (1) would not prevent that deduction. As to
the deduction for the trust or estate’s exemption, it is true
that individuals are allowed a personal exemption de-
duction. It is far from clear, however, that the personal
exemption deduction allowable to individuals would be
treated as the same deduction as the exemption deduc-
tion allowable to a trust or estate by section 642(b).
Unless those exemption deductions are treated as the
same, the purported conflict that Cohen asserts would
not exist. For the sake of discussion, let us assume that
the exemption deductions will be treated as the same.
Even in that case, because paragraph (1) applies only to
deductible costs, and because an exemption deduction is
not a cost, paragraph (1) cannot apply to the exemption
deduction. Consequently, without regard to the adminis-
tration cost provision of the first clause of paragraph (1),
the second clause of paragraph (1) cannot possibly apply
to any of the deductions listed in paragraph (2).
As previously stated, Cohen asserts that paragraph (1)
would negate paragraph (2) if it were not for the limita-
tion in the first clause of paragraph (1) restricting the
application of that paragraph to trust (or estate) admin-
istration expenses. Accordingly, he concludes that Justice
Sotomayor’s construction does not make the trust admin-
istration expense limitation superfluous.
I pointed out in my response to Cohen that paragraph
(1) applies exclusively to deductible costs, and so cannot
apply to any of the items in paragraph (2), which consists
of an exemption allowance and the deduction for distri-
butions to beneficiaries, neither of which are ‘‘costs’’ in
any sense of that term. If the trust administration expense
limitation were deleted from paragraph (1), the para-
graph would read, ‘‘The deduction for costs which would
not have been incurred if the property were not held in
such trust or estate.’’ That sentence would not apply to
the deductions listed in paragraph (2) because none of
those items are costs of the trust or estate.
In his reply to that point, Cohen attempts to show that
the trust administration expense provision is necessary to
protect the full deduction of the items listed in paragraph
(2). He points out that a trust could pay expenses of a
beneficiary, such as educational costs, and he maintains
that, in common parlance, a trust’s payment of a benefi-
ciary’s expenses would be considered costs incurred by
the trust. He contends therefore that those costs would be
subjected to the second clause of paragraph (1) if it were
not for the limitation that paragraph (1) applies only to
trust administration expenses, and so he concludes that
the trust administration expense provision would not be
made superfluous by Justice Sotomayor’s construction.
To quote him, ‘‘A trust, however, might pay the expenses
of its beneficiaries, for example, for education or travel.
Those expenses would be, in common parlance, costs
incurred by the trust. However, they would not be costs
incurred in the administration of trust property.’’7
Contrary to Cohen’s assertion, a trust’s payment of
expenses of a beneficiary is not a payment of costs of the
trust itself. Rather, it constitutes a constructive distribu-
tion to the beneficiary whose expense was paid and a
constructive payment of that expense by the beneficiary.
The payment of the expense is a payment on behalf of the
beneficiary. It is not a payment of an expense incurred by
the trust. The payment would be deductible by the trust
under section 651 or section 661 as a distribution to a
beneficiary. It is significant to note that if a trust’s
payment of a beneficiary’s expense were not treated as a
distribution to the beneficiary, there would be no basis for
allowing the trust a deduction for that payment; in which
case, neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) would
apply to the payment because those provisions apply
only to deductions.
Also, even if a trust’s payment of a beneficiary’s
expense were treated as a cost of the trust, and even if
somehow the payment was deductible by the trust, any
deduction that might be allowable for that ‘‘cost’’ would
not come within paragraph (2). Paragraph (2) applies
only to deductions for the exemption allowable to the
trust and for distributions made by the trust under
section 651 or section 661, the provisions of which
provide a deduction for distributions made, or that are
required to be made, to the trust’s beneficiaries. So, the
type of payment to which Cohen refers has no bearing on
the issue under discussion.
Moreover, if the trust’s payment were not treated as a
distribution to the beneficiary, that would conflict with
the basic structure of subchapter J, the part of the code
that deals with trusts and beneficiaries. The trust is
allowed a deduction under section 651 or section 661 as
an element of the congressional scheme to provide
passthrough treatment for a trust’s income that is distrib-
uted (or required to be distributed) to a beneficiary. The
6See supra note 3.
7See supra note 5, at 712.
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trust deducts distributions to, or on behalf of, a benefi-
ciary,8 and the beneficiary takes into account the trust’s
income with the same characteristics that it had in the
hands of the trust.9 The scheme is to treat the trust as a
passthrough entity to the extent that the trust makes (or
is required to make) distributions to beneficiaries. If the
trust’s payment of a beneficiary’s expense were not
treated as a distribution to the beneficiary, the latter
would have no income from that payment, and the trust
likely would not qualify for a deduction. Payment of the
educational expenses of a beneficiary, for example,
would not be deductible by the trust unless the payment
is treated as a distribution to the beneficiary; and it will
be so treated.
Cohen claims that ‘‘in common parlance’’ a trust’s
payment of those expenses would be considered as
payment of the costs of the trust. Common parlance has
no relevance here. The question that must be determined
is the operation of a word in a tax statute. It is not the
meaning of the word ‘‘costs’’ that is in question; rather, it
is the operation and scope of that term as it is used in the
statute. In the context in which the word ‘‘costs’’ is used
in section 67(e)(1), it clearly refers only to costs incurred
by the trust. Expenses incurred by a beneficiary on his
own behalf are not expenses incurred by the trust.
Moreover, even if common parlance were relevant, it is
far from clear that a lay person would consider a trust’s
payment of a beneficiary’s expenses to be a cost of the
trust.
Common parlance includes the views of people who
have no knowledge of what a trust is or how it operates,
much less how the tax law deals with trusts. The views of
the general public on the characterization of trust activi-
ties have no bearing on how a tax statute should be
construed. The construction of a tax statute is not a
proper subject for a referendum or a poll of the general
public.
The Choice Between ‘Would’ and ‘Could’
A second point made by Chief Justice Roberts focuses
on the use of the word ‘‘would’’ in the second clause of
paragraph (1). The second clause reads ‘‘which would
not have been incurred if the property were not held in
such trust or estate.’’ As Chief Justice Roberts noted, and
as both Cohen and I have agreed, the use of the word
‘‘would’’ in that clause creates an ambiguity. The deter-
mination of whether an expense would be incurred if it
were held by someone other than the trust or estate rests
on a prediction or speculation of what would occur in a
situation that does not actually exist. The statute leaves
open the question of the standard to be employed in
making that prediction. There are several possible stand-
ards that could be employed.
One possible choice is to speculate whether the actual
beneficiaries of the trust in question would be likely to
incur that expense if they held the property. That subjec-
tive approach was not adopted by any of the courts that
have dealt with the issue and has nothing to support it.
The standard adopted by Justice Sotomayor, and en-
dorsed by Cohen, is that the expense must be one that no
one other than a trust or estate could incur. In other
words, it must not be possible for the expense to be
incurred by anyone other than a trust or estate. I noted in
my last article10 that it is possible to construe the statute
in that manner. The ultimate question, however, is not
whether it is possible to construe the statute in that
manner, but rather the question is whether there is
another construction of the statute that better accords
with the text of the statute. Whatever one thinks about
the restraining force of text on statutory construction,
when, as here, there is no legislative history indicating
what Congress thought about this issue, the text is all that
the courts have available to make their determination.
Instead of those two standards, the Supreme Court,
and several Circuit Courts of Appeals that previously
passed on this issue, have adopted the standard of
whether it would be customary for persons other than an
estate or trust to incur the expense.11 This approach
avoids the subjectivity of having to predict the likely
behavior of the actual beneficiaries of the trust, and
instead adopts an objective standard of community be-
havior. Because the use of the word ‘‘would’’ requires a
prediction of what would take place, using a community
standard is a reasonable means of measuring whether it
is more likely than not that the expense would be
incurred outside of the trust.
Chief Justice Roberts stated several reasons in support
of the adoption of a community standard and for reject-
ing the narrower construction that Justice Sotomayor and
Cohen prefer. One of those reasons is discussed above —
namely, that Justice Sotomayor’s construction causes a
significant portion of the statute to have no application or
effect, and that consequence would contravene the canon
of construction to read a statute so that every part of it
will have significance. A second point that Chief Justice
Roberts made was that Justice Sotomayor’s construction
effectively changed the word ‘‘would’’ to the word
‘‘could,’’ and if Congress had intended to require that the
expenses could not have been incurred outside of the
trust, they likely would have used the word ‘‘could.’’ The
fact that Congress chose to use the word ‘‘would’’ instead
of ‘‘could’’ suggests that Congress did not wish the clause
to apply only when it is not possible for the expense to be
incurred outside the trust.
In his first article, Cohen argued that Congress could
have eliminated the ambiguity that exists by adding one
of several other words. If Congress wished to adopt the
approach taken by Chief Justice Roberts, it could have
added the word ‘‘customarily’’ after ‘‘would not’’ so that
the clause would read in part, ‘‘would not customarily
have been incurred.’’ Alternatively, if Congress preferred
Justice Sotomayor’s construction, it could have added
the word ‘‘ever’’ after ‘‘would not’’ so that the clause
8Sections 651 and 661.
9Sections 652 and 662.
10See supra note 4.
11Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003), Doc
2003-11125, 2003 TNT 86-1; Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265
F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001), Doc 2001-23461, 2001 TNT 176-10;
Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181 (2008).
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would read in part, ‘‘would not ever have been
incurred.’’ Cohen correctly noted that the failure of
Congress to add either of those words no more points to
Chief Justice Roberts’s construction than it does to
Justice Sotomayor’s. He then concluded that the failure
of Congress to choose the word ‘‘could’’ also has no
bearing on the proper construction of the statute.
In my prior article, in response to Cohen’s argument,
I contended that there is a difference between the failure
of Congress to add a word or words that would improve
the statute’s clarity, and Congress’s choice of one word
rather than another in its drafting of the statute. Many
statutes could be improved with the addition of some
word or phrase, but that has little bearing on the con-
struction of the provision. On the other hand, the choice
of one word to the exclusion of another readily available
and similar word that would give a different meaning is
quite significant. The choice of ‘‘would’’ instead of
‘‘could’’ is especially significant in this context because
the two words are commonly used and so were readily
available to Congress to make its choice; and because,
although there is a significant difference between the two
words, they have much in common, so it seems likely
that one drafting the statute would have thought of both
words if he thought of either one. The similarity in the
sounds of the two words makes it even more likely that
the choice of one over the other was not merely an
accident, but rather reflects a deliberate choice. Let me
quote briefly from my prior article:
[Chief Justice Roberts] did not raise the question of
why a word was missing when its addition would
have clarified the issue. Rather, he asked why
Congress chose the word ‘‘would’’ when the word
‘‘could’’ would have been more precise if that was
Congress’s intent, especially because ‘‘could’’ is far
from being an obscure term.
A vast number of tax statutes would have been
more precise if a word or phrase had been added.
In construing those statutes, not much weight can
be given to the omission of those words. However,
Congress’s choice of one word instead of another
highly accessible word that would have given a
different meaning to the provision is very signifi-
cant.12
In his reply to my piece, Cohen repeats his point that
Congress could have added the word ‘‘customarily,’’ and
he contends that the absence of that word is no less
significant than the failure to use the word ‘‘could.’’ I
responded to that argument in the statements quoted
above from my prior article, but Cohen did not mention
my contention or reply to it. Because Cohen made no
mention of the distinction I made between the omission
of a word and the choice of one word over another, we
really have not yet joined issue on that question.
Cohen does make the point that Congress’s choice of
the word ‘‘would’’ may ‘‘signify a lack of consciousness
about the ambiguity inherent in the statute. . . . Or it
might reflect a legislative decision not to resolve this
ambiguity and instead to allow courts to determine more
specifically how to apply the language.’’13 Of course, that
is possible. But, the possibility of other explanations does
not make it inappropriate to draw on the most likely
explanation. Congress will sometimes deliberately leave
an ambiguity in a statute rather than to continue to
debate a controversial issue. There is nothing about the
issue in question that suggests that it would engender a
sharp division in Congress over its resolution. Nor is
there any legislative history that indicates the issue was
debated. Whether Congress simply was unaware of the
issue, and so did not choose language to clarify it, is
always a possibility when an ambiguity exists. But courts
have to resolve statutory ambiguities when the issue
arises. If there is no legislative history to guide them, the
courts have to draw reasonable inferences from the text
of the statute, from the policies underlying the statute,
and from general principles that draw on a pool of
experience with the determination of the likely meaning
of language. That is the reason that maxims of statutory
construction have been adopted; they are general prin-
ciples that are aids to determining the likely intent of the
legislature. In applying these principles, it is necessary to
assume that the legislature acted rationally and had a
purpose. If that assumption is not made, there is no basis
for making any judgment about the meaning of the
statute.
Cohen treats each separate point that Chief Justice
Roberts made as if his ultimate decision rested solely on
that point. That is not the case. Each of the points that
Chief Justice Roberts made supports his decision, but that
is not to say that any one of them alone would have been
sufficient. The accumulation of those points takes on
greater weight than any one alone has. Moreover, the
whole is greater than the sum of the parts in that each
added factor gives strength to the other factors.
The Solicitor General and Treasury’s Position
In his original article,14 Cohen observes that after
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was published, Treasury
promulgated a proposed regulation adopting her view,
and the solicitor general adopted her view as one of his
arguments in the Supreme Court’s review of that case.
Cohen asserted that those adoptions by Treasury and the
solicitor general ‘‘affirmed the validity, and perhaps the
superiority, of Justice Sotomayor’s approach.’’ In my
prior article, I responded:
The significance of Treasury’s temporary adoption
of Justice Sotomayor’s view is minimized by the
fact that Treasury often takes into consideration,
when choosing the position it takes on an issue,
which position will increase the amount of revenue
collected — that is, it takes the position that favors
its interests. Justice Sotomayor’s construction
would both increase revenue collection and serve
administrative ease of enforcement, and so it is not
surprising that Treasury would favor that position.
Perhaps that was not the reason that Treasury
12See supra note 4.
13See supra note 5.
14See supra note 3.
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promulgated its proposed regulation in this case,
but that possibility reduces the significance of its
adoption. As for the solicitor general’s brief, it is not
unusual for an advocate to urge, on review in a
higher court, the position that the lower court took
in deciding the case in favor of the advocate’s
client. As to both Treasury’s and the solicitor gen-
eral’s actions, Cohen’s view that the approval of a
court’s holding by the winning party demonstrates
the validity of that holding is extraordinary to the
point of being bizarre.15
In response, Cohen said:
Is it sensible, however, to equate the position taken
by Treasury and the solicitor general as no different
from that of any self-interested private litigant?
Treasury has a special interest in the fair and
effective administration of the tax laws. The solici-
tor general has an obligation, not just to try to win,
but to pursue the fair and effective application of
the U.S. code. Surely their endorsement cannot be
dismissed as if they were private litigants with only
private interests to pursue. Surely their endorse-
ment supports the judgment that Judge Sotomay-
or’s approach did not, as Chief Justice Roberts
claimed, fly in the face of the statute.16
I am not sure that Cohen’s statement is entirely
responsive to my point; but, in any event, it is unpersua-
sive. I did not claim that the position that Treasury took
in the proposed regulation was of no consequence at all.
What I said, and what seems fairly obvious, is that
Treasury’s self-interest in increasing the revenue and
reducing its administrative burden ‘‘reduces the signifi-
cance of its adoption.’’ In other words, one has to
approach that proposed regulation with a fair amount of
skepticism. Moreover, given that the proposed regulation
was promulgated while the litigation was still in progress
distinguishes it from the usual circumstances surround-
ing the issuing of a regulation. Anyone familiar with tax
law knows that Treasury does not always act inde-
pendently of its self-interest. The timing of this proposed
regulation makes it especially vulnerable to doubts. The
Second Circuit’s decision in Rudkin was issued on Octo-
ber 18, 2006. The proposed regulation17 was promulgated
on July 27, 2007, seven months after the Second Circuit’s
decision. The Rudkin case was argued to the Supreme
Court on November 27, 2007, five months after the
proposed regulation was promulgated. It would not
require a cynical disposition to suspect that the proposed
regulation was promulgated to improve the govern-
ment’s litigating prospects in the case pending before the
Supreme Court.
As for the position taken by the solicitor general, it is
true that he was not merely a litigant, but he was a litigant.
There are occasional circumstances when the solicitor
general will take a position contrary to his litigating
interest because of some overriding policy consideration.
The solicitor general will not take a position that would
undermine what he sees as the proper administration of
the tax law, but there are few circumstances in which that
consideration arises. The Rudkin case did not present a
situation of that nature. The question of whether to
accept Justice Sotomayor’s construction was a technical
one of fairly limited consequence. It is not the type of
issue that would induce the solicitor general to abandon
his litigating cap. Like any litigator, the solicitor general’s
office will try to win the case it is presenting. Moreover,
there are other considerations, peculiar to a government
attorney that would lead the solicitor general to adopt
Justice Sotomayor’s approach even if he harbored doubts
about it. A government litigator will not lightly fail to
urge on appeal the rationale used by a judge below in
deciding in favor of the government. The government
likely will have cases in the future before that same judge,
and it will not wish to irritate the lower court judge by
not defending the view that judge adopted in deciding
the case for the government. If the government fails to
advance the lower court’s rationale as one of its argu-
ments, it risks facing a hostile reception when it next
appears before that judge. The risk is greater with some
judges than others, but it is possible that it was one of the
considerations that the solicitor general’s office took into
account.
In any event, whatever weight one might give to
Treasury’s position, surely it did not validate Justice
Sotomayor’s position or demonstrate its superiority to
Chief Justice Roberts’s. Treasury has been known to take
invalid positions. Even its final regulations have some-
times been held to be invalid, but the regulation in
question was merely a proposed regulation. A proposed
regulation is promulgated by Treasury before it has
received comments from the tax bar and before it has
been subjected to public scrutiny. When a proposed
regulation is replaced, the final regulation that is adopted
often is dramatically different from the one that was
proposed. Even in the normal situation when a proposed
regulation is not connected to ongoing litigation, it would
seem extravagant to suggest that it demonstrates the
superiority of Treasury’s position.
It should not be forgotten that this dispute is not just
the view of Chief Justice Roberts versus the view of
Justice Sotomayor. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion was
written on behalf of the entire Supreme Court; it was a
unanimous decision. If, in the mind of Cohen, the view
adopted by one litigant in the case validates that view
because the litigant also has a public role, is not the view
adopted by a unanimous Supreme Court that has no ax
to grind in the case worthy of even greater weight? The
question of the validity of conflicting statutory construc-
tions should not be determined by the identity of the
person or entity that holds them, but rather by an
analysis of the virtues of the conflicting views. It is not
whom you trust; it is what logic dictates.
If Cohen’s statement about the weight to be accorded
to a solicitor general’s litigating position were valid, it
would seem to mean that anytime the solicitor general
appeared in court there should be a strong presumption
that the position of the government is the superior one. If
that were true, there might be little need to have the
government litigate in the Supreme Court; the solicitor
15See supra note 4, at 1265.
16See supra note 5, at 712.
17Prop. reg. section 1.67-4.
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general’s adoption of a position would be sufficient to
sustain it. Speaking ex cathedra, the solicitor general
would be something of a secular pope. Since for the
government to appeal from a decision it lost in a trial
court the appeal must first be approved by the solicitor
general’s office, this presumption of correctness would
seem to apply equally to appellate court cases in which
the government is the appellant. Strangely, contrary to
that assumption, the solicitor general and the govern-
ment have not always prevailed in litigation.18 Appar-
ently, the courts do not share Cohen’s extraordinarily
high confidence in the solicitor general’s office.
Policy Overriding Statutory Text
Cohen and I both believe that the limitation on the full
deduction of some trust expenses by section 67(e)(1) is
poor tax policy, and the limitation should be repealed.19
Cohen suggests that my objection to the statute led me to
prefer Chief Justice Roberts’s construction because it
narrows the range of expenses that would be denied full
deductibility by that statute. While that may be a virtue
of the Supreme Court’s construction, it did not influence
my approval of it. Within constitutional limits, Congress
has the role of determining tax law, and I do not condone
a court’s substituting its judgment for Congress’s when it
disapproves of what Congress did. Whether or not I
agree with congressional decisions, I see the proper role
of a court in construing a statute as implementing the
intent of the legislature as best it can. If legislative history,
including the climate in which the statute was adopted,
indicates a purpose for the statute, that purpose should
be implemented even if it means straining or even
ignoring statutory text. Congress sometimes does make
mistakes in the language employed in statutes, and if the
statutory purpose can be ascertained, it should take
precedence. In most cases, the text of a statute will control
because a contrary legislative purpose will not be evi-
dent.
In the Rudkin situation, there was no indication of a
legislative purpose that would point to one of the com-
peting constructions over the other. Legislative purpose
can be derived from more than the congressional com-
mittee reports and hearings. The apparent role of a
statute in the income tax system can provide an insight
into its purpose. The identification of the abuse at which
the statute was aimed also can provide an insight. There
was no information of that nature that shed light on the
construction issue discussed in these articles. In that
circumstance, the statutory text is controlling. But in this
case, the text is ambiguous, and so the court must resolve
that ambiguity. For the reasons stated above, Chief Justice
Roberts’s resolution of that ambiguity is far superior to
Justice Sotomayor’s. In addition to those reasons, there is
another item that supports the Supreme Court’s view.
As noted above, the natural meaning of the word
‘‘would’’ in the second clause of paragraph (1) of section
67(e) requires a prediction of whether the expense in
question would have taken place if the property were not
held in trust. In other words, would an individual who
held the trust’s property have incurred the same ex-
pense? Justice Sotomayor determined that Congress did
not intend there to be speculation whether an individual
would have incurred such expenses and chose instead to
adopt a bright-line rule that excludes from full deduction
all expenses that are not uniquely those of a trust or
estate. That approach essentially rejects the notion that
the term used by Congress requires a prediction. By
including in full deductions only those expenses that
cannot possibly be incurred by an individual, that makes
the term ‘‘would’’ refer to the current status of the item’s
deductibility rather than to a prediction of likely behav-
ior. Because the natural reading of the term ‘‘would’’
requires a prediction of likely behavior, the Supreme
Court’s adoption of the customary community standard
adheres to that natural meaning and provides an objec-
tive standard for applying it.
At the end of my first article,20 I stated, in an aside
observation, that a court might have chosen to permit a
full deduction in the Rudkin situation because the ex-
pense in that case was for investment advice; and if the
trustee had charged for its own service in determining
the investment of the trust’s assets, the trustee’s fee
would be fully deductible. I suggested that because
Congress clearly intended to allow a full deduction for
that type of service when conducted by the trustee, the
statutory language could be expanded to permit an
expense incurred for the same service performed by a
third party to be fully deducted on the ground that that
treatment was consistent with the apparent legislative
purpose even though it does not fit the literal statutory
language. Cohen raises the question of whether my
willingness to strain or ignore statutory language in that
case is reconcilable with my application of statutory
language in rejecting Justice Sotomayor’s construction. I
see no inconsistency. In the case of Justice Sotomayor’s
construction, there is no evidence of a legislative purpose
that would support departing from the statutory text. As
to my suggestion that the statutory language could be
ignored or expanded to permit a deduction of the invest-
ment advisory expenses, I relied on the apparent legisla-
tive intention to allow those expenses to be deducted. I
do not see a substantive difference between a service
performed by a trustee and the same service being
delegated to a third party to perform. I therefore con-
cluded that the legislative decision to allow a deduction
for the cost of the trustee’s performance of that service
likely incorporates an intention to allow a full deduction
for that cost no matter who performs it.
18A famous example, with which tax lawyers are familiar, is
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
19See supra note 5, at 712.
20See supra note 4.
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